Chronic Lack of Meaning and Purpose Empirically Defined

Chronic Lack of Meaning and Purpose Empirically Defined:         

A gestalt of Valuelessness and Value-inefficacy

Julene M Cook

Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Resilientselftherapy@gmail.com

ORCID identifier 0009-0004-1336-2649

www.linkedin.com/in/Julene-cook-7bba3348

Introduction

An explosion of research shows meaning and purpose in life (MP) is important for human flourishing (for review see Bronk, 2014). However, recent findings suggest that up to fourteen percent of people are troubled by its absence, and in economically developed countries, a further fifty percent cognitively avoid or report indifference to the topic (Schnell, 2021., Zhang, et al., 2018).  Scores for most historical MP scales (Salsman, et al., 2020; Schnell, 2011; Steger, et al; 2006, Zhang, et al., 2018) aggregate item responses for meaning with those for purpose, and in the earlier scales, with related constructs (Morgan & Farsides, 2009).

In contrast, recent scales of meaning presence reflect two similar tripartite theories of MP (George & Park, 2016; Martela & Steger, 2016), each derived from grouping the theoretical and empirical literature into the themes of meaning as purpose, meaning as comprehension and meaning as mattering (Costin & Vignoles, 2020; Login & Park, 2017) or significance (Martela & Steger, 2023; Zhanhong et al., 2021). These scales produce separate scores for the three themes. However, theme definitions remain loose and open to interpretation.

Within tripartite theories, the definition of meaning as purpose is the most precise. It summarises the growing consensus that purpose in life is a form of meaning involving committed progression towards intrinsically motivated, self-concordant goals, that structure life by guiding it towards personally valued outcomes (Martela et al., 2023; Steger, 2012., Osai, 2016; Wong, 2016). Some researchers (Bronk, et al., 2010) have required goals to be altruistically self-transcendent in addition to the transcendence of projecting the self into the future.   

The recent, tripartite 3DM scale (Martela. et al., 2023) defines comprehension or coherence meaning as, ‘life and its events making sense’.  This definition is just as frustratingly amorphous as predecessors such as, a life-structuring cognitive framework (Battista & Almond, 1973; Mascaro & Rosen, 2006) and ‘sense-making’, whether about the self (Costin et al., 2020), interpersonal relationships (Heine et al., 2006), or life (Reker et al., 1988).  The 3DM definition could mean reasons for the existence of a unique individual within a unique situation (Frankl, 1965) or universal context (Costin et al., 2020), belief that life-structuring, personally valued life-goals are being achieved (Battista & Almond, 1973), clarity about cause-effect relationships that enables reliable predicting (Antonovsky, 1993; Baumeister, 1991; Seeman, 1972), perceiving organisation within stimuli (Heintzelman et al., 2013),  sense-making that provides coherence over time, or consistency and connection between perceptions, actions and goals (Schnell, 2021).

Meaning as significance is defined in the 3DM as, perceiving value and worth in personal existence (Martela et al., 2023). This contrasts with Bergner’s (1998) worth or value of things within life, resonant action with consequences (Schnell, 2021) and mattering to others within a universal context (Costin & Vignoles, 2020; Login & Park, 2017).

Additionally, theorists characterise all aspects of meaning as emotionally salient, but in different ways. For Frankl (1965, 1972) meaningful feelings result from passionate commitment to living towards self-transcendent goals.  Klinger (1977) argued they come from engagement with moment to moment, emotionally infused incentives and Hermans (1989) regards meanings as constantly changing, emotionally charged self-narratives.

Schnell (2021) has proposed that the belongingness of engaged social contribution is a fourth dimension of meaning. Additionally, recent studies (Schnell, 2021; Zhang, et al., 2018) show that people can be grouped by their degree of need for meaning and their degree of confusion, ambivalence, avoidance, indifference or distress about it.

Various tests intercorrelate strongly (Chamberlain, et al; 1988., Schulenberg et al., 2011; Martela et al., 2023) so all may be valid quantifiers. However, ascertaining the level of something does not define it. Without parsimonious, empirically derived definitions, research is very little closer to understanding meaning in life, in ways that will predict successful interventions for those who are troubled by its absence. For instance, what type of sense-making might help such people? Can people make sense of life without perceiving it as meaningful and could meaning as significance connect the other aspects, as suggested by recent 3DM findings (Martela & Steger, 2023).  Most importantly, in what ways are extremely high correlations with universal needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2002; Demirbas-Celik, 2019; Martela, et al., 2018, 2023; Zhang et al., 2018), connected to meaning as sense-making, significance and purpose?

To meet the ongoing need for empirically derived, concise and precise definitions of meaning and purpose and its absence, Cohan and Cairns (2012) called for in-depth, small n, qualitative studies and Russo-Netzer et al. (2016) called for phenomenological studies. Empirical-phenomenological researchers (Giorgi, 1985a, 1985b; Von Eckartsberg, 1986) point out that psychology has largely skipped the science of definition and classification in favour of hypothesis testing. A science of description requires a rigorous, replicable methodology for identifying a topic’s essential ‘whatness’.  Husserl (1971, 1977) argued that when the topic is a human experience this entails suspending presuppositions and identifying commonalities in multiple people’s descriptions of their lived experience of it. This paper presents and illustrates explicit, empirically generated operational definitions of chronic lack of meaning and purpose (CLMP) that were explicated through such a methodology.

Method

Empirical-phenomenological design

Husserl’s empirical-phenomenological method is particularly suited to defining the apparently ephemeral experience of meaning and purpose in life and its absence.  Rather than hypothesis testing the researcher develops a three-phase methodology that systematically puts aside preconceptions about the experience of interest to focus instead on identifying and describing the defining constituents of its lived experience.  First-hand experiencers are recruited to give descriptions with sufficient detail for the researcher to understand from the experiencer’s perspective. Next, rather than applying pre-determined codes to accounts, systematic procedures explicate the constituents in each description independently from the others. Thirdly, systematic procedures are used to identify commonalities evident in all accounts. Such commonalities will both characterise each lived experience and transcend each, in that they will be conceptual rather than concrete. Together they will provide an empirically derived definition of the experience being studied. Further detail on this study’s empirical-phenomenological epistemology, including the treatment of preconceptions, is available as Online Resource 1.

Data Collection

Ethics approvals to conduct the study were granted by the Ethics Review Committee (Human Subjects) at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia.

Self-identified current and past experiencers of CLMP volunteered in response to two separate advertisements at that university or by word of mouth. The consent forms for each group specified the research goal as defining CLMP through identifying commonalities between the interview-based descriptions of all participants, with the ultimate goal of developing an effective therapy for it.  In signing a consent form each experiencer agreed to give audio-recorded interviews that would be confidential except for de-identified quotes included in disseminated findings under pseudonyms known only to the researcher. Current experiencer volunteers were provided with options for accessing independent post-interview psychological therapy and any referrals were made with the experiencer’s written permission.

Detailed experiencer descriptions were collected via audio-recorded, atheoretical, in-depth interviews. Each interview lasted from 60-90 minutes with one experiencer interviewed four times. All interviews began by asking what attracted the respondent to volunteer. Current experiencer volunteers made detailed verbal descriptions of their experiences of CLMP in response to atheoretical interviewer requests to describe their experience of CLMP, including its onset, any thinking, feelings, bodily experiences and behaviour involved, any similarities and differences between lack of meaning and lack of purpose, a specific instance of feeling one or each strongly, the key aspects of their experience and their experience of being interviewed. As previously reported (Denne et al., 1991), each past experiencer volunteer was asked to describe their experience CLMP as a context for describing their transition to meaning and purpose in life.

Beyond these queries, the interviewer’s role was limited to asking open-ended questions, active listening, paraphrases to check understanding and prompts for details, examples and clarifications.   Throughout, the interviewer tried to suspend presuppositions about what interviewees meant by the words and phrases they used in favour of asking for clarifications.

After interview, its recording or previously transcribed record was reviewed for goodness of fit as an account of current or past experience of CLMP.  One interview was inaudible and therefore discarded, as was one transcript that did not contain interviewee use of meaning, purpose or derivative words. The remainder sorted into twelve describing past CLMP and twelve describing current CLMP, including those of three transitioner volunteers whose interviews actually demonstrated current versus past CLMP.   The validity of self-identification for the current experiencer volunteers was confirmed by a Purpose in Life mean score (Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964) of 64.67.

Demographic information had not been systematically sought.  However, the following demographic data was embedded in interviewee descriptions.  All but two of the twenty-four were university based but only four were pursuing a psychology-oriented career. There were ten men and fourteen women with varied socio-economic backgrounds and aged from eighteen to fifty-five. Eleven interviews included impacts of a parent’s religious connection and five described impacts of being a first or second-generation immigrant.

The current interviews were then transcribed.  Combined with the previously transcribed interviews this yielded a data base of about 300,000 words.

Data analysis

The specific procedures for explicating and summarising the constituents of each experiencer’s description, and for identifying commonalities between all descriptions were based on those of Giorgi (1985b), combined with the rigour of micro-explication (Denne et al., 1991).

Micro-explication of constituents within-accounts

Each transcript was ‘micro-explicated’ (Denne et al., 1991) to identify all its constituents using the following procedures, examples of which are presented in Online Resources 2 and 3.

The transcribed interview was entered into the Kwalitan 4 qualitative research software (Peters & Wester, 1994), divided into sequentially numbered segments representing topic changes. Then codes representing the topic and quality of descriptions in the segment were attached.  Thereafter, Kwalitan could be asked to collate all segments from one or more transcripts tagged with specified code(s).

Starting with segments coded as containing interpretive keys, parenthesised letters (a-z) were inserted to depict every new idea, and numbers to depict any sub-components. Thus, the reference (Alfred, 8a.1) denotes the first sub-part (.1) of the first idea (a) in segment 8 of Alfred’s transcript. Of each annotated fragment, the researcher then asked, what is being communicated and what is the essential aspect of this idea?  Answers resulted from assessing match between alternate possibilities and contextual evidence within the same or other segments of the transcript.  Interpretive weight was given to those segments with more detail or keys to interpretation.  These answers were then incorporated into a referenced segment summary, which was attached to its transcript along with emergent constituent codes that further summarised its content.     

Next all segment paraphrases of the transcript were combined into a fully referenced whole transcript summary, as illustrated in the left-hand column of Table in Online Resource 3. Referenced summary codes for each constituent contained in the transcript summary were further crystallised and attached to it as shown in the centre column.

These micro-explicatory steps forced the researcher to focus on the experiencer’s described experience alone, sustained intense interest in it, ensured that all and only the described material would be systematically summarised and provided evidential sources for each summary stage.

Comparison of Micro-explicated and Artificial Intelligence generated summaries. The effectiveness of micro-explication to produce complete, bias free summaries, was tested by comparing micro-explicated referenced summaries with those produced by the artificial intelligence programs, ChatGPT and Atlas-ti. Table 1 in Online Resource 3 demonstrates an 88.67% concordance of ideas between micro-explicated constituent codes for Alfred’s transcript and the ChatGPT summary if it.   However, the AI summary lacked connection between different ideas. Table two (Online Resource 3) showed the same problem in a segment summary made by the dedicated qualitative research AI program, Atlas-ti. Specifically, AI did not connect the interpretive key, that Alfred values relatedness to other material about relationships, resulting in missing what was essential to that content.

Identification of between-account commonalities and manifesting variations

The constituent codes attached to each transcript were then collated via a Kwalitan search, rephrased to incorporate uniform wordings for the same idea and grouped as illustrated in table 1 of Online Resource 4.

These codes were then entered into the rows of an Excel spreadsheet, with each participant allocated a column as illustrated in table 2 in Online Resource 4. This enabled a systematic process of recording in the cells whether each constituent was evident in each of the twenty-four accounts.  To make each decision, original transcripts, their summaries and attached constituent codes were repeatedly reviewed. Such systematic review identified constituents that had previously been missed in particular transcripts, led to further rephrasing of constituent labels and to distinguishing between commonalities and their varying manifestations.

The process of reconceptualising and rewording proceeded by generating multiple conceptualisations and phrasings of a potential higher order constituent code label and selecting the one that fitted all transcripts. Thus, the excel constituent rows were successively reorganised under conceptualisations with higher levels of abstraction. Table 2 (Online Resource 4)  shows the final Excel version of the commonality named ‘lack of value-generating sense-making’ and its varying manifestations. The creation and phrasing of commonalities was necessarily interpretive and therefore vulnerable to researcher bias. Thus, the results section will include multiple evidential quotes to illustrate each.

Results

Tables showing between-account commonalities and their varying manifestations for past and current experiencers, are presented in Online Resource 5.   Figure one below, summarises the definitional commonalities present in all accounts and the relationship between chronic meaninglessness and chronic purposelessness. Capitalised headings show the higher order commonalities.  Together they define chronic meaninglessness as a self-perpetuating, experiential gestalt of valuelessness and value-inefficacy, within which, chronic lack of purpose related to lacking personally valued and achievable goals for life’s activity.

Onset triggered by uncontrollable, value-destructive experience

Meaninglessness onset was triggered by one or more types of uncontrollable, value-destroying experiences that changed the structure of life and impacted relatedness. To summarise, sixteen experiencers described value-destroying abusive behaviour, serious illness, or decisions by a parent or family member.  Six experienced abuse or rejection by peers or authorities. For seven, value was destroyed by confrontations with death and for nine it was destroyed by internal factors including physical injury, uncontrollable emotions or the invalidation of a value-generating worldview.

The centrality of powerlessness and uncontrollability in these value-destroying experiences was summarised by Ruth (8). ‘Meaninglessness means that there is something we have no control over at all’ (e). Similarly, Kim was powerless to stop her mother’s physical and emotional abuse (14f, j, 15a) or to leave home (19a,g). Nor could she avoid or release the tension’ of ‘all consuming’ angry reactions to abuse that she ‘can’t do anything about’ (14e-e.5). Gary (9b) ‘needed desperately to find some way of ordering everything … I couldn’t have any effect over … powerless’ and Helen (6) said, ‘you just have no power (b) or control’ (c).

Value-destructive experiences were highly emotional and frequent as in interpersonal abuse, or had ongoing consequences such as deaths, injury, inability to pursue a highly valued career or the loss of a life-structuring worldview.  Consequently, all descriptions of meaningless onset showed it was triggered when these experiences destroyed or prevented the development of value-generating assumptions. After discovering at age nine, that her identity was a shameful family secret, Ruth lacked a reason for her ‘individual existence’ (44a). Her parents never acknowledged her and she was not ‘special’ (12c) or ‘an outstanding individual’ with ‘a great gift (36i.2) …  just part of the ant-like structure of humanity’(12b). She said (6), ‘it’s a struggle to make sense of life itself if we are just going to be here to reproduce and die’.  After his father’s sudden death, Brian (25) ‘couldn’t find anything to believe in’ (g). Tony (19) asked, ‘what's the point’ if human life is like that of a butterfly which simply reproduces and dies? Twenty years after his valued worldview was shattered, Bob still searches for a replacement.

CLMP: A gestalt of valuelessness and value-inefficacy

Value-inefficacy. Experiencers were left confused and questioning without value-generating answers to provide motivating reasons for existing or striving.  Instead, they formed the value-destructive expectation that anything they could value would be unattainable.

This expectation was termed value-inefficacy, to encapsulate the finding that all lacked self-efficacy specific to what each valued, whether it was happiness and contentedness, a specific career path, relatedness, altruism, external acknowledgement, or achievement and success.

Experiencer articulations of value-inefficacy include Ruth’s statement (15) that, ‘I have had the most beautiful intentions’ (i) but ‘haven’t been able to make them a reality’ (j).  Now, ‘if I try it (h) I don’t feel I would achieve it (h.1) …  You can’t plan and expect plans to be realised’ (b-b.2). Will (15) said, ‘I felt as if I couldn’t succeed anyway so why try? Whatever (c.1) I do (w) won’t turn out right (d-d.2) so why bother trying?’ (y). Brian (7) expected his value of living in peace (b-d) was unattainable (a, b, g). A good assignment result was meaningless for Mary because she expected to fail the subject (3n) and depression made valued career goals seem unachievable to Bruce (14g,25c).  Kim summed up value-inefficacy in saying, ‘With meaninglessness … all the effects seem to be bad’ (26f) so ‘you don’t think anything is worth trying for’ (12b).

Being expectational, value-inefficacy projected the self into a valueless future.  However, it was experienced in the present. Furthermore, it was not just a cognition but a gestalt of reciprocally interacting aspects of valueless experience, as depicted by the arrows in diagram one. Thus, value-inefficacy trapped experiencers into the chronic meaninglessness of a strengthening cycle of valueless experience, variously composed of the constituents outlined below. Full details on the nature and implications of each will be given in dedicated articles.

Deficits of value-generating sense-making

The thinking of value-inefficacy was characterised by confusion, negativity and inability to make value-generating sense of life’s experiences. It was a preoccupying concern. Eighty-three percent of accounts described rumination about valuelessness and value-inefficacy despite attempts by seventy-one percent to avoid consciousness of it. Its extreme negative thinking was shown by preoccupations with death in three-quarters of accounts and suicidal ideation in over half.  The certainty of value-inefficacy varied. However, all but one current account and 67% of past accounts described periods of hopelessness to realise value.

In its most fundamental form, this lack of value-generating sense-making involved the inability to make sense of cause-and-effect relationships in ways that predicted value-attainability.  Thus, Bruce could not see ‘any discernible reason’ (6f, 7d, 10i, 11k, l) in the form of a cause (9), for value-destructive outcomes (7c, 8k, w).  Joan could find no sense in negative events with no discernible cause in those they impact (35, 38e). Will experienced intense lack of MP on receiving ‘quirky, haphazard’ (2q.1) exam results that seemed unrelated to effort (2p.4-5) or competence (2q.2) and prevented entry to a valued career path (4o-p). Garry (24) lacked ‘a reason’, a way of thinking that anticipated valued endings such as his ‘terrorised’ mother being rewarded (b.2) and his abusive father helped or punished (c-d).

Nine accounts evidenced value destructive worldviews that made everything valueless. Sally valued companionship (3) but grew up with religious beliefs that predicted rejections and aloneness (6). After a family tragedy Helen expected life would involve value-destruction for everyone (4g.2,9c-c.2; 12g-g.3). Will (33) ‘didn't believe in anything (i) anymore (i.1) … unless it was some sort of violence or death (i.1) … nemesis, nothing’ (12g) so ‘nothing mattered’ (18b, c). Seeing the elderly ‘dying like animals … rotting alive’ (14g) threw Kris into ‘philosophical shock (14o) … that the sanctity attached to human life by humans … was rubbish’ (23). John experienced meaninglessness while ever he was convinced that (16d-d.2), ‘we are no different to a barnyard of pigs or a swarm of flies (34) … causally determined by electro-chemical impulses’. Such philosophies provided coherent sense-making about life’s lack of meaning, it’s valuelessness.

A value-constricted self

Experiencers attributed causes of their value-inefficacy to themselves (79%), the external world (75%) or oscillated between the two (54%).  Either way, powerlessness about what mattered to individuals reflected low agency and living in response to the external world rather than to what was internally important. All but two experiencers described seeking external causes or solutions for valuelessness, seventy-one percent evidenced low individuation of self-concept and values, and for seventy-nine percent, self-definition, self-value and behaviour were reactive to perceived or actual external opinions and feedback. The effect was a more constricted self with less agency and stronger value-inefficacy.

All but four perceived themselves as valueless, although only Kris, Ruth and John spoke of being insignificant in the context of the universe. Barbara (9) thought she was ‘a piece of shit …  just worthless’ (9) and Margaret thought she was ‘a pretty hopeless, pathetic person’ (16). Gary (7) said, ‘the biggest thing, I didn’t like who I was’ and Joan (34) said, ‘if there’s no good me … what’s the point of me living? … I really hate myself’.  Ann had lost the ‘part of my identity that I was a worthwhile person’ (15c-d) and Mary (5) said, ‘when you’re suffering from depression you are meaningless to yourself because you’ve lost all your self-esteem’ (c).

Other statements illustrate how self-value was diminished through assessing it via external criteria.  Will (30g-i) viewed his friend’s rejection and suicide as evidence of his valuelessness.  Seeing his managing director father fail and studying literature depicting human powerlessness and faults shattered Richard’s self-value. Chronic childhood bullying (10a) explained as survival of the fittest (10b, 3b-b.7&g,16) convinced John (6d, 10b) he was unworthy of existing (5a,6d, f). Similarly, Beth’s (7) feeling that ‘I was just nothing … had no value’ (7c) in light of perceived societal values (d-g) led to being found in a coma after attempting suicide (3e-f).

Emptiness of value and dysthymic angst

Chronic meaninglessness was described using words and phrases depicting valueless experience. These included, ‘empty of value’ (Kris, 25), ’nothing’s worth anything’ (Kris 25, Fay, 29,19), ‘a load of rubbish’ (Will, 22n), ‘emotionally unimportant’ (James, 30), ‘stupid’ (Joan, 29) and ‘irrelevant’ (Louise,16a).  Ann (12), ‘was desperately seeking for some purpose, some real meaning (f) … that would make my life worthwhile or valuable’ (f.2). This absence of value was experienced as a ‘void’ (Fay 31), ‘vacuum’ (Louise, 25h), ‘a gaping gulf of nothingness (Will 22m), a ‘big black hole’ (Marg, 4e), ‘profound emptiness … nothing to fight against and nothing to live for’ (John, 12a.1, f-g) and ‘life just being totally empty’ (Richard,19), ‘so empty’ that Joan (7c) felt stomach pain with nausea (20).  The expectancy that value was unobtainable meant there was no value-generating reason for striving or existing, leaving all but one experiencer without motivation other than to escape (54%) rebel or take revenge on perceived external causes of it (17%).  Sixty-three percent described feeling mechanical, ‘‘like a robot’ (Helen, 7e), ‘like someone who’s had a lobotomy … with minimal thinking and feeling’ (Bob, 25).

Additionally, there was dysthymic angst, a term denoting a constant background of valuelessness, including depressive (100%) and anxious (92%) or frustrated to angry feelings (63%) and internal conflict (43%). These emotions were highly aversive, emotionally alienating and motivated social withdrawal by 79% of experiencers even though some said meaninglessness could coexist with transitory pleasure or fun.

Deficits of value-generating action

With value anticipated as unattainable, experiencers were left without motivating reasons for value striving or living itself. Striving towards unattainable value was meaningless, ‘absurd’ (Joan, 18f), ‘futile’ (Brian, 4d), ‘pointless’ (Kim, 10n, Joan, 29, Will, 21a), as were activities that were value-incongruent or value-irrelevant, even if interesting and easy. Thus, Louise’s (4) studies ‘meant nothing’ (a) because ‘they didn’t relate to my life (e.1) … I was good at maths’ (f.2) but ‘it didn’t mean anything’. Competency in his current career direction (23e) was meaningless (6i) to Alfred because it undermined the social competence he valued (5e, 14g-i, 26h.3-4).

Without the motivation of value-efficacy, seventy percent of experiencers had given up value striving in favour of value-incongruent behaviours. All accounts evidenced escapist behaviours, ranging from periods of total inactivity (67%), sleeping, substance abuse (25%), social withdrawal (79%), or cognitive avoidance (71%). There were also compulsive activities aimed at filling the vacuum (29%), self-destructive behaviours (25%) such as neglect of self-care, self-mutilation, disordered eating (25%), parasuicide (25%), or either explosive (25%) or demonstrative (17%) violence.  Specific behaviours co-varied with the experiencer’s fluctuating degree of certainty that value was unattainable, their attributions of causality and their available means of coping. In all its forms this lack of value-generating action ensured the non-realisation of value.

Chronic lack of purpose:

Valuelessness and value-inefficacy related to goals for life’s activity

Sixteen accounts contained description specific to purpose or its absence, rather than meaning and purpose together. As summarised in online resource 5, these accounts showed it to be a form of meaninglessness specific to the lack of valued and achievable long-term goals to orient and motivate life’s activity. Thus, Joan (31) distinguished the ‘emptiness’ of ‘meaninglessness’ from ‘purposelessness’… ‘no goals, not achieving anything. What do you want to aim for?  …  I really wouldn’t know’.  Similarly, Alfred (17h.1) ‘didn’t have a plan or goal’ and Bruce (12) said, ‘in purposelessness … you don’t know what you’re going to do’.

To deliver purpose goals needed to relate to large sections of life. Mary (13) said ‘purpose is … looking towards the future (c) … who you are (f) and … where you’re going’ (g). Brian (2) explained, ‘planning something a couple of days … or even months’ ahead ‘which I’m going to enjoy (h) but doesn’t seem to be leading anywhere (k.1) in terms of long-range things (3a) like what I’ll actually achieve’ (3b), ‘may be meaningful but is purposeless’ (3).

To be purposeful goals needed to be personally valued beyond needs for survival. A goal of circumnavigating Australia (b) would not be meaningful to Louise if it was irrelevant to what she valued (18f) and Kim (3) said that if her activity ‘does have an aim (a), then that aim isn’t worthwhile’ (b).

Value-inefficacy was causal in all descriptions of purposelessness.   Bruce (25) said, ‘if there is no hope for you to achieve your goals’ they ‘are destroyed and therefore you feel purposelessness’. Beth (76) explained that ‘according to … the meaning of … what you value … (a.1), you … set up your aims and your purpose (a.2) … and then you act to achieve that purpose (c). However, she had not set up such aims due to feeling incapable of living according to what she valued (68).    Similarly, Alfred’s lack of a life goal resulted from expecting he was not the kind of person who could achieve what he valued. This led to drifting into an achievable but hated value-incongruent career path. Tony’s valued career path became unachievable due to being influenced by his previously estranged father to pursue a despised alternative.

For some, low individuation and self-awareness or the loss of valued aspects of a previous identity created the value-inefficacy of not knowing what was personally valued.  Life was purposeless when Bob did not know what vocation he valued (13). Helen (13) said valued goals and plans were destroyed due to lack of differentiation from her psychotic brother. John (20) described himself as ‘dominated by my parents’ (c) and ‘totally anonymous’ (i). James (22a-a.1) had not ‘the faintest idea of who I was … no identity apart from what my parents thought’. He achieved socially expected goals but experienced them as unsatisfying (2k) and ‘superficial’ rather than ‘emotionally important’ (30).

As with James, achieved goals also became purposeless when they did not produce value, or were not expected to.  Mary (12) aimed to become a physical therapist (d) but could see no way of paying for post graduate study (19). Thus she asked, ‘what’s the purpose’ (g) of continuing to strive towards an undergraduate degree.

This lack of a means to realise value was particularly evident when the aim was self-value through positive feedback (Kim, Fay, Sally, Joan).   Kim (7g, j) had no aims other than her mother’s expectations and when her achievements (4a, 5a.2, f, 11h) were demeaned she concluded, ‘everything which I thought was worth aiming for...is either unachievable...totally beyond my reach...or pointless anyway’ (11n-n.2 5e-f)

For others valued life goals were destroyed when value-destroying experience created value-inefficacy.  Ann’s self-efficacy for valued goals was destroyed by physical injury and because no matter how much effort she put in (17), her valued goal of ‘happy families’ (b) was repeatedly ‘blown up … It felt like building sandcastles … everything could look wonderful and then suddenly it would all be gone’ (17a, g.1).  Experiential realities after immigrating (8) ‘killed’ Nancy’s previous value-efficacious self-concept (17b, f, 3d.1) and career goals.  Will was twice denied entry into intensely valued career paths (9,10). Ruth’s family prevented her earliest career aspiration, chronic illness prevented entry to a mid-life choice and fear of negative feedback prevented a third.  She said (8), ‘if you can't achieve (j.1) what you want to do (m)...the purpose of living (j) isn't there’ (j).

Unattainability expectations left all who described purposelessness without motivation for value-generating action, resulting in value-incongruent, irrelevant (58%) or avoidant (42%) behaviour.  Will (15) overcommitted himself to avoid awareness of expecting that (h) ‘whatever it is (c.1) it's not going to turn out in my favour (b-c) … You'll get kicked in the teeth’ (d).

Ten accounts described chronic purposelessness as a lack of forward movement, a cycle of trying and failing to realise value or not trying and achieving nothing of value in life.   Three described boredom and half the purposelessness accounts described frustration and internal conflict between desire for change and the amotivation of value-inefficacy.

Living unstructured by what individuals value

The lack of value and value-efficacy that characterised every aspect of the experience of chronic lack of meaning and purpose in life left its experiencers rudderless, controlled by externals rather than an internal guiding structure. Nancy was ‘lost’ (5, 10d), Louise (3f) didn’t ‘have a direction’ (3f), Mary (13) ‘didn’t know where I’m going’.  Daily life was value-incongruent, experienced as a mechanical (Ruth, Bob) and even desperate (Sally) struggle or as unmotivated ‘emptily walking about’ (Richard, 6), ‘going through the motions’ (James, Joan), ‘drifting’ (Will, 13), a confused waiting (Fay, Margaret), a ‘muddling through’ that didn’t ‘seem to be going anywhere’ (Brian, 2k-k.1), ‘like someone who is in a bed wired up to machines’ (Richard, 6),‘expecting to ‘just exist’ until death (Will, 19h-j).

Summary: Chronic meaninglessness empirically defined

Valueless and value-inefficacy were expressed in all the reciprocally interacting constituents just outlined. This leads to the clear, parsimonious and empirically derived definition of chronic meaninglessness as an experiential gestalt of valuelessness and expected powerlessness to realise value.  It defines chronic lack of purpose as a form of chronic meaninglessness specific to being without valued and achievable goals for life’s doings. Without value, individual existence lacked a guiding structure and experiencers felt confused, lost, empty and assessed life itself as not worth living.

Discussion

Implications for tripartite theories of meaning and purpose

Meaning as Significance. These results support Martela & Steger’s (2023) recent suggestion, that significance, defined as value within life, is the defining essence of all three themes of tripartite theory. The missing value in chronic meaninglessness emerged as anything a person might value if it were attainable. This supports Bergner’s (1998) conception of value in meaningfulness and is closer to ‘significance’ (Martela et al., 2023) than the ‘mattering’ of one’s life being valuable to others or within a universal context (Costin et al., 2020; Login et al., 2016). Results further show that it is what a person values and expects to be attainable that provides motivation, continuity, structure and direction to life.

Meaning as Purposelessness was confirmed to be a form of meaninglessness specific to the lack of achievable, self-concordant life goals. Current results further clarify that to be purposeful, such goals do not need to be altruistic but if they are not personally valued, before, during and after their achievement, they will be experienced as meaningless and purposeless.

Meaning as Lack of comprehension/Coherence meaning was also specifically defined as lack of value-generating sense-making, ranging from Seeman’s (1972) inability to accurately predict value through cause-and-effect relationships to confusion and questioning with only value-destructive answers. Such confusion matches reported high correlation between confusion and meaninglessness (Zhang et al., 2018).

The Centrality of Agency and Value-efficacy

The current results also show that to be meaningful and purposeful, what is personally valued must be perceived as attainable. Potential value remained meaningless when it was anticipated to be unattainable and consequent lack of motivation fits the definition of amotivation (Deci & Ryan, 2002).  Furthermore, it was the reciprocally interacting components of the experiential gestalt of value-inefficacy that maintained meaninglessness for chronic experiencers.

For all experiencers, value-inefficacy involved deficits of various types og deficit in agency; the uncontrollability of value-destruction, inability for value-generating sense-making, anticipated powerlessness to realise potential value and the consequent amotivation of Deci & Ryan (2002). For most it involved low self-value and low awareness of personally motivating and achievable values. Such identity deficits are congruent with identity-oriented theories (Atkinson & Feather, 1966; Baumeister, 1991; Klinger, 1977; Burrow et al., 2010). Furthermore, they suggest causality within strong reported correlations between MP and self-concept clarity (Blazek & Besta, 2012., Martela et al., 2023), self-esteem (Stillman et al., 2009; Taubman, 2011; Zhang et al., 2018), self-efficacy (DeWitz et al., 2009; Osai, 2016; Walia, 2017), autonomy and competence (Deci & Ryan 2002; Demirbaş-Çelik, 2019; Martela et al., 2018, 2022; Zhang, et al., 2018).

That the invalidation of value-assumptions involved relationships is also congruent with the  high correlations between MP and relatedness reported in these last studies.  However, it is well established that relationships are the value most frequently cited as a source of meaning (De Vogler & Ebersole, 1980, 1981,1983, Zika & Chamberlain, 1992). Thus, relationships should be viewed as a potent source of value or valuelessness rather than Schnell’s (2021) proposed addition to tripartite theory.  Indeed, the current results clarify that whilst meaning as comprehension and meaning as goals remain useful distinctions, both manifest valuelessness and value-inefficacy.

Implications for increasing MP in general populations

Given that most people do report having meaning and purpose (Heintzelman & King, 2014), these results predict that in general populations it can be increased by focusing people’s awareness on what they value. Indeed, in value-destructive circumstances, those with previous meaning and purpose shift focus to alternate sources of value (Heine et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2022). Recent randomly controlled hope-based (Feldman & Synder, 2005) and value x expectancy interventions (Azimain et al; 2021, Duan et al., 2022), have substantially increased MP in groups with value-destructive medical conditions.  Such programs likely succeed by facilitating recovery of MP in those with pre-existing value-efficacy. Even when facing death, focus on self-transcendent value (Frankl, 1965), such as reminiscing on past value, contributing to value for succeeding generations or value-generating beliefs about death itself, remains available.

Implications for resolving chronic lack of meaning and purpose

Denne et al., (1991) reported that shifts to proactive, self-responsible living was the first of five commonalities between the retrospective experiencers’ accounts of transition to MP.  The current results show that CLMP always involves value-inefficacy, usually involves low self-value, self-awareness and value-awareness.  Jointly, these empirical findings suggest that when lack of meaning and purpose is chronic, value-inefficacy prevents sustained commitment and striving towards value, in the manner of an underlying schema (Young, et al., 2003) or core construct (Kelly, 1955). Thus, psychological help for CLMP should focus on whatever self-development is needed to create an identity with strong and stable value-efficacy. Without this, challenges to make and live according to personal value commitments are unlikely to succeed.

Strengths and limitations of this study and suggestions for future research 

This study provides the first empirically derived definitions of CLMP. They show valuelessness to be the essence of all three themes of tripartite theory and that in chronic experiencers, existential vacuum manifests identity deficits and is maintained by value-inefficacy.  Therefore, test items based on the current results, would differ markedly from existing scales. Items measuring purpose, would focus on having and making progress towards life goals that are perceived as achievable and personally valued, before, during and after their achievement.  Items measuring comprehension would ask about value-generating sense-making. This would prevent high scores for those who make sense of events and life via value-destructive worldviews. Items measuring significance would target perceived value and value-efficacy.

The specificity and parsimony of these definitions result from a rigorous and replicable, atheoretical methodology which applied Husserl’s principle, that a human experience can be defined by the commonalities between the descriptions by first-hand experiencers. The current sample is contextually dependent and may not generalise to other cultures, the less academically able, those who cognitively avoid, are indifferent to (Schnell, 2010, 2021; Zhang, et al., 2018), or experience temporary lack of meaning and purpose. Nevertheless, as Frankl asserted, the need to experience value in living is likely to be universally human, although the content of what is valued by different cultures and individuals varies.

Historically, descriptive studies of human experience occupy a very small niche within the research literature due to labour intense but insufficiently replicable methodologies and belief in a science of hypothesis testing.  In this study, comparisons between description summarised through manual micro-explication and artificial intelligence produced high congruence. This suggests that judicious use of artificial intelligence could increase the practical viability and replication of empirical-phenomenological research.  However, current artificial intelligence failed in interpreting the parts of a description in the context of other parts and interpretive keys in particular. Thus, it was less competent at identifying more abstract commonalities than their concrete manifestations. The micro-explicatory approach of annotating every idea and idea part within a transcript, also enabled referencing of all data reductions and results. Furthermore, it facilitated understanding of the most confusing transcripts in this study and clarified when presuppositions were clouding understanding.

The extensive phenomenological data set of this study holds many more answers to perennial questions about the presence and absence of existential meaning. Articles on each aspect of the experiential gestalt of CLMP, its precursors, whether purposive goals must be altruistically self-transcendent and whether definitions of meaning and purpose are direct opposites of their absence, will follow.  They will further clarify the relationships between CLMP and identity variables, value-destructive experiences, worldviews and psychopathologies.  Together they will provide an empirical basis for developing effective psychological interventions for chronic existential vacuum.

Article Take-aways

In the absence of an empirically derived definition of meaning in life, tripartite theories distinguish meaning as purpose, meaning as comprehension/coherence and significance/mattering. However operational definitions remain elusive.

The Method

This study used a rigorous empirical-phenomenological methodology to identify definitional commonalities between extensive descriptions of chronic lack of meaning and/or purpose in life (CLMP) by self-identified experiencers of it.

The Results:

Meaninglessness Equals Valuelessness

Purposelessness is the Lack of Personally Valued and achievable life goals

The commonalities defined chronic meaninglessness as a gestalt of valuelessness with value being what was potentially important to an individual.

Value-inefficacy was a self-perpetuating, multidimensional experiential gestalt that maintained meaninglessness through reciprocal interactions between its parts.

Uncontrollable, value-destroying experiences interacted

A constricted, externally oriented identity

A confused deficit in value-generating sense-making

Valueless feelings

The purposelessness of making no progress towards valued and attainable goals and

A lack of value-generating action.

Implications

1. Valuelessness underlies all three divisions of tripartite theories:

    The lack of

    And a fourth Dimension:

• Meaning as Behaviour - Lack of value-generating behaviour.

2. Help for chronic experiencers must target the gestalt of value-inefficacy that maintains it.

Online Resources

SI 1 The empirical-phenomenological research paradigm.

SI 2 Data analysis: Table illustrating within-segment micro-explication.

SI 3 Data analysis: Tables comparing micro-explication with artificial intelligence.

SI 4 Data analysis: Tables illustrating the search for between-account commonalities

SI 5 Results: Tables summarising  between-account commonalities and their manifestations